Effects of the Timing of Auditors' Income-Reducing Adjustment Concessions on Financial Officers' Negotiation Judgments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tan, Hun-Tong; Trotman, Ken T.
• 署名单位: Nanyang Technological University; University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0823-9150
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01020.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1207-+
• 关键词: client; PERSPECTIVE; frequency; RECIPROCITY; magnitude; QUALITY; offer

摘要

We develop and test a conceptual model, based on reciprocity and anchoring theories, that posits how the timing of income-reducing adjustment concessions made by an auditor influences auditee management's judgments. Our model hypothesizes that auditors' concession timing strategies influence management's offers, which affects their satisfaction with the negotiation outcome and which in turn affects their intention to continue their relationship with the auditor. We conduct an experiment where financial officers negotiate with a hypothetical auditor. We manipulate between-subjects auditors' concession timing strategies. Our results show that financial officers provide higher income-decreasing audit adjustments (as preferred by the auditor) when the auditors use gradual or delayed concessions as opposed to early concessions. These offers mediate the effects of concession timing strategy on financial officers' satisfaction, which in turn affects their intention to continue a relationship with the auditor.