Discussion of Target's Tax Shelter Participation and Takeover Premiums

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shevlin, Terry
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Irvine
• 刊物名称: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0823-9150
• DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12227
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1473-1488
• 关键词: earnings management; avoidance; Aggressiveness; incentives; executives; OWNERSHIP; FIRMS; US

摘要

Chow, Klassen, and Liu (2016), hereafter CKL, examine whether M&A bidding firms are willing to pay more for target firms that disclose they have not participated in a tax shelter sometime in the past. My discussion provides an overview of the past and current tax literature in accounting and places CKL within this expanding literature. I then provide a critique of this interesting and well-executed study that exploits an unusual disclosure to examine tax shelter participation effects.