Discussion of The Effects of Vertical Pay Dispersion: Experimental Evidence in a Budget Setting
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Huddart, Steven
署名单位：
Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
刊物名称：
CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0823-9150
DOI：
10.1111/1911-3846.12248
发表日期：
2017
页码：
577-581
关键词：
摘要：
Guo, Libby, and Liu (2017) (hereafter GLL), examine how pairs of experimental subjects interact in a game framed as a funding request from a privately informed subordinate to a superior. When the superior's pay is higher than the subordinate's, subordinates display more self-serving dishonesty and superiors are more tolerant of it than when their pay is the same. In this discussion, I compare GLL's design with an ultimatum game, consider additional tensions that arise in pay-level comparisons, address the applicability of their results, and suggest some extensions. I conclude by calling for new theory that regularizes GLL's surprising findings.
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