Conflicting Transfer Pricing Incentives and the Role of Coordination

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blouin, Jennifer L.; Robinson, Leslie A.; Seidman, Jeri K.
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Dartmouth College; University of Virginia
• 刊物名称: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0823-9150
• DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12375
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 87-116
• 关键词: MULTINATIONAL-CORPORATIONS; DECISION; taxes; FIRMS

摘要

Our study evaluates the role of coordination, at both the government and the firm level, on the transfer prices set by U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) when income taxes and duties cannot be jointly minimized with a single transfer price. We find that either the presence of a coordinated income tax and customs enforcement regime or coordination between the income tax and customs functions alters transfer prices for these firms. Our analyses have implications for both firms and taxing authorities. Specifically, our findings suggest that MNCs might decrease their aggregate tax burdens by increasing coordination within the firm or that governments might increase their aggregate revenues by improving coordinating enforcement across taxing authorities. Our study is novel in that we document, in a specific setting, how coordination influences MNCs' tax reporting behavior.