Subjectivity in Professionals' Incentive Systems: Differences between Promotion- and Performance-Based Assessments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bol, Jasmijn C.; Leiby, Justin
• 署名单位: Tulane University; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
• 刊物名称: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0823-9150
• DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12393
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 31-57
• 关键词: organizational citizenship behavior; Impression management; CONTEXTUAL PERFORMANCE; FEEDBACK-SEEKING; career outcomes; HELP-SEEKING; INFORMATION; FIRMS; task; determinants

摘要

We examine how managers assess performance and promotion prospectsthat is, the ex ante likelihood of promotionand the conditions under which these assessments diverge. We argue that managers apply different cognitive schemas when they make different assessments. To the extent that a signal provides different information about future versus current contributions, assessed performance and promotion prospects are likely to diverge. In two experiments, we manipulate professionals' promotion eligibility and level of consultative decision making. We find that experienced managers assess performance and promotion prospects differently, but only when professionals are promotion eligible. Specifically, more (as opposed to less) consultative decision making decreases promotion prospects while not affecting assessed performance (Experiment 1) or even improving it (Experiment 2). By contrast, more consultative decision making improves both assessments when professionals are not eligible for promotion. We shed light on the relations between subjective assessments, including that promotion is not necessarily the consequence of superior assessed performance.