Information Quality and Endogenous Project Outcomes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Deng, Mingcherng; Nan, Lin; Wen, Xiaoyan
• 署名单位: City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Purdue University System; Purdue University; Texas Christian University
• 刊物名称: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0823-9150
• DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12459
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 732-757
• 关键词: Incentives; CHOICE

摘要

In this study, we show that when a firm needs external financing, information quality has real effects via financing contracts on the firm's input to influence its operational outcome. Interestingly, we find that higher information quality decreases overall efficiency. Our analysis highlights the importance of considering the role of information quality in the presence of the firm's input decision upon financing contracts. In particular, information quality has a feedforward effect on the firm's real input decision via financing contracts, which in turn has a feedback effect on financing contracts and overall efficiency.