Trader Participation in Disclosure: Implications of Interactions with Management

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Elliott, W. Brooke; Grant, Stephanie M.; Hobson, Jessen L.
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
• 刊物名称: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0823-9150
• DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12524
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 68-100
• 关键词: CONFERENCE CALLS; information-content; Price efficiency; attention; investors; analysts; ACCOUNTABILITY; PRESENTATIONS; expectations; performance

摘要

Technological advances are creating a shift in the information disclosure environment allowing more investors to interact with management. We examine three key levels of trader-management interaction to assess the accuracy of traders' market-tested value estimates and resulting market price. These data require an engaging experiment and a complex, contextually rich asset, which we create by playing a popular gaming app before the experiment. Participants view financial information, ask management questions, estimate value, and trade. We find that receiving non-personalized question responses improves trader estimates of value and market price efficiency relative to when traders ask questions but do not expect a response. This occurs because traders exert more effort estimating value and trading. However, receiving personalized versus non-personalized responses harms value estimates and market efficiency. This occurs because traders receiving personalized responses fixate on the interaction with management, dividing their attention and diverting it away from valuing and trading the asset.