Short Sellers and Long-Run Management Forecasts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Xia; Cheng, Qiang; Luo, Ting; Yue, Heng
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University; Tsinghua University
• 刊物名称: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0823-9150
• DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12554
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 802-828
• 关键词: information; credibility; investors

摘要

We examine how short sellers affect long-run management forecasts using a natural experiment (Regulation SHO) that relaxes short-selling constraints on a group of randomly selected firms (referred to as pilot firms). We find that compared to other firms, the pilot firms issue more long-run good news forecasts but do not change the frequency of long-run bad news forecasts. The increase in good news forecasts is greater when the pilot firms have higher-quality forecasts, greater uncertainty about firm value, or higher manager equity incentives. Overall, these results and the results of additional analyses indicate that the reduction in short-selling constraints and the increase in short-selling threat induce managers to enhance disclosures through more long-run good news forecasts to discourage short sellers.