The Role of Timing and Management's Remediation Actions in Preventing Failed Remediation of Material Weaknesses in Internal Controls*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Imdieke, Andrew J.
• 署名单位: University of Notre Dame
• 刊物名称: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0823-9150
• DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12725
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 157-198
• 关键词: Sarbanes-Oxley; audit fees; control deficiencies; corporate governance; RESTATEMENTS; QUALITY; CONSEQUENCES; determinants; DIRECTORS; FAILURE

摘要

Prior research finds that signals of remediation of internal control weaknesses do not guarantee that all weaknesses are fully resolved. However, why certain remediation strategies fail is unclear. This study examines how remediation timing and actions affect the likelihood of a failed remediation. I predict and find that the likelihood of a failed remediation is decreasing in both the time a company takes to remediate and in the extent of remediation actions employed. Importantly, this study documents that disclosures of material changes in internal control provide information useful in assessing the likelihood of a failed remediation, as well as evidence that prompt remediation does not necessarily result in a successful remediation. Moreover, I find that there are consequences to remediation failures in the form of a higher likelihood of management and board turnover. Finally, I find evidence that economic benefits of remediation found in prior research may be understated. This study can provide stakeholders with insights into how the nature, extent, and timing of a remediation strategy can reduce the likelihood of a failed remediation.