Throwing in the towel: What happens when analysts' recommendations go wrong?

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Lee, Kenneth; Aleksanyan, Mark; Harris, Elaine; Manochin, Melina
署名单位:
Loughborough University; University of Glasgow; Roehampton University; University of Birmingham; Loughborough University
刊物名称:
CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN:
0823-9150
DOI:
10.1111/1911-3846.12875
发表日期:
2023
页码:
1576-1604
关键词:
strong structuration QUALITATIVE RESEARCH MARKET INFORMATION KNOWLEDGE industry emotion regret
摘要:
Every analyst will experience stock recommendation failures during their career. Unlike many other professions, these pivotal moments occur in the full glare of clients, colleagues, equity-sales teams, and the media. This research explores the practices of analysts up to and beyond the point where, faced with a failing recommendation, they contemplate throwing in the towel on their recommendation. Based on empirical evidence gathered from interviews with sell-side analysts and their key interlocutors-equity-sales specialists, investors, and investor relations officers-this paper uncovers several new empirical insights into the recommendation practices of analysts. The main argument made in the paper is that capitulation practices emerge from the specific contextual framework of individual recommendations and the analyst's conduct as a knowledgeable, emotional human agent. We identify several contextual contingencies of stock recommendations that underpin how a capitulation episode unfolds, including the temporal proximity of the capitulation to the original recommendation; the importance and profile of the stock to the analyst's reputation (franchise intensity); the level of interest/reaction from clients, equity-sales teams and corporates; the nature/cause of recommendation failure; and recommendation boldness. Our study provides evidence that what an analyst does when faced with a failing recommendation cannot be reduced to a predictable, rational process and informs our understanding of observed practices such as the reluctance of analysts to capitulate and why recommendation paralysis often follows a recommendation capitulation.
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