Asymmetric adjustment of control

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: van Pelt, Victor
• 署名单位: WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management
• 刊物名称: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0823-9150
• DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12886
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 2203-2225
• 关键词: sticky prices; median splits; DECISION; COSTS; PSYCHOLOGY; motivation; systems; NORMS

摘要

This study examines how principals adjust their control over agents based on their prior controlling experience. According to standard economic theory, principals should be equally willing to decrease their control as they are to increase it. However, I use psychological theory to predict that prior experience with exercising tight control reinforces a principal's belief that agents are self-interested and that they should be controlled. In contrast, I predict that the reinforcement of the belief that agents are socially interested and should not be controlled is weaker for principals who have prior experience with exercising loose control. I test my prediction using an experiment that exposes principals to either an increase or a decrease in the economic costs of control. The results support the predictions by exhibiting an asymmetric adjustment pattern. The data also show theory-consistent conditions under which the asymmetry in principals' control adjustments diminishes. Overall, my study suggests that prolonged experience with exercising high levels of control over agents may cause principals to hold on to their control disproportionally. Ajustement asymetrique du controleCette etude examine comment les mandants ajustent leur controle sur les mandataires en fonction de leur experience anterieure en matiere de controle. Selon la theorie economique standard, les mandants devraient etre tout autant disposes a reduire leur controle qu'a l'accroitre. Cependant, l'auteur utilise la theorie psychologique pour formuler l'hypothese selon laquelle l'experience anterieure de l'exercice d'un controle strict renforce la perception d'un mandant que les mandataires servent leur propre interet et qu'ils doivent etre controles. En revanche, l'auteur emet l'hypothese selon laquelle le renforcement de la perception que les mandataires servent l'interet general et ne doivent pas etre controles est moindre pour les mandants qui ont deja exerce un controle souple. L'auteur teste son hypothese a l'aide d'une experience qui expose les mandants a une augmentation ou a une diminution des couts economiques du controle. Les resultats corroborent les hypotheses en presentant un modele d'ajustement asymetrique. Les donnees indiquent egalement des conditions conformes a la theorie sous lesquelles l'asymetrie des ajustements de controle des mandants diminue. Globalement, cette etude suggere que l'experience prolongee de l'exercice d'un controle renforce sur les mandataires peut amener les mandants a conserver leur controle de maniere disproportionnee.