Firm-level political risk and bank loan contracting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Saffar, Walid; Wang, Yang; Wei, K. C. John
• 署名单位: Hong Kong Polytechnic University; University of Sydney; University of Sydney
• 刊物名称: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0823-9150
• DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12951
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1577-1607
• 关键词: Financial constraints; Policy Uncertainty; INVESTMENT; cost; section; IMPACT; price

摘要

We investigate the impact of firm-level political risk on loan contracting. We find that firm-level political risk is positively associated with bank loan cost and that this effect is stronger for firms experiencing increased operational uncertainty and higher default risks. Firm-level political risk also leads to more unfavorable non-pricing loan terms. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we use an instrumental variable approach and placebo tests. We further find that political connections and relationship-based borrowing can attenuate the adverse effect of firm-level political risk on loan contracting. Risque politique inh & eacute;rent aux entreprises et contrats de pr & ecirc;ts bancairesCet article explore l'impact du risque politique inh & eacute;rent aux entreprises sur les modalit & eacute;s de contrats de pr & ecirc;ts. Les r & eacute;sultats montrent une corr & eacute;lation positive entre le risque politique inh & eacute;rent aux entreprises et les taux des pr & ecirc;ts bancaires. Cet effet est plus important pour les entreprises confront & eacute;es & agrave; une incertitude op & eacute;rationnelle croissante et des risques de cr & eacute;dit accrus. De plus, le risque politique inh & eacute;rent aux entreprises conduit & agrave; des conditions de pr & ecirc;t non tarifaires plus d & eacute;favorables. Pour att & eacute;nuer les probl & egrave;mes d'endog & eacute;n & eacute;it & eacute;, une approche utilisant des variables instrumentales et des tests plac & eacute;bo sont appliqu & eacute;s. Les conclusions indiquent en outre que les relations politiques et les emprunts contract & eacute;s aupr & egrave;s d'une relation peuvent limiter l'effet n & eacute;gatif du risque politique inh & eacute;rent aux entreprises sur les contrats de pr & ecirc;t.