The real effects of transparency in crowdfunding

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nan, Lin; Tang, Chao; Wang, Xin; Zhang, Gaoqing
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0823-9150
• DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12903
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 39-68
• 关键词: social value; Dynamic incentives; public information; disclosure; COORDINATION; PERSPECTIVE; COMPETITION; ECONOMICS; PRIVATE

摘要

In this paper, we investigate the real effects of information transparency in crowdfunding markets. Our analysis shows that the crowdfunding market features an under-implementation inefficiency, driven by two types of uncertainty that consumers face: fundamental uncertainty about the entrepreneur's implementation cost, and strategic uncertainty due to potential coordination failures among consumers. We find that when both fundamental and strategic uncertainties are present, eliminating the fundamental uncertainty alone by revealing the implementation cost does not necessarily improve efficiency. Surprisingly, from an ex ante perspective, greater transparency makes the coordination among crowdfunding consumers less efficient, which makes the under-implementation problem even worse and thus impairs efficiency. Our findings send a message of caution against promoting greater transparency in the crowdfunding market.