Indirect earnings management

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Jackson, Scott B.; Rasso, Jason T.; Zimbelman, Aaron F.
• 署名单位: University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia
• 刊物名称: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0823-9150
• DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.70006
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: motivated skepticism; cognitive-dissonance; real; manipulation; BIAS

摘要

We hypothesize that managers use their hierarchical role as reviewers of accounting judgments and estimates to manage earnings, which we call indirect earnings management (IEM). Across a series of experiments using highly experienced financial executives as participants, we provide evidence that IEM (1) is likely used by managers to achieve current and future earnings targets, (2) reduces both cognitive dissonance associated with managing earnings and the extent to which managers think that their behaviors constitute earnings management, and (3) is more likely to be used when corporate governance is strong than when corporate governance is weak. The results of this study suggest new directions for future research on earnings management and highlight the important role of the hierarchical structure of the accounting function in efforts to understand how earnings are managed.