CEO (in)activism and investor decisions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Durney, Michael T.; Johnson, Joseph A.; Sinha, Roshan K.; Young, Donald
• 署名单位: University of Iowa; University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
• 刊物名称: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0823-9150
• DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13004
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 525-552
• 关键词: SELF-ESTEEM; PSYCHOLOGY; PREJUDICE

摘要

Many CEOs engage in activism by publicly expressing their views on social, environmental, and political issues, while other CEOs refrain from doing so-a behavior we term CEO inactivism. We use two experiments to examine how CEO (in)activism impacts investor decisions. Our results are consistent with our theoretical predictions. When a CEO expresses an activist position that is consistent versus inconsistent with investors' views, investors invest more in the CEO's firm because they perceive the CEO more positively. We also find that CEO inactivism can lead to investment decisions that are as favorable as when the CEO expresses a position consistent with investors' views; our process evidence suggests that this may occur because CEO inactivism increases the likelihood that investors believe the CEO shares their position on a social issue. Finally, we do not find evidence that investor decisions are influenced by whether CEO (in)activism is in response to an external prompt. This study contributes to the emerging literature on CEO activism, a unique form of voluntary disclosure, by providing evidence about how CEO (in)activism influences investors. We also contribute to the literature examining the impact of social media disclosure on investor decisions. Finally, our findings have practical implications for CEOs, who increasingly face external pressures to engage in activism.