A Transaction Cost Perspective of the Software as a Service Business Model
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Susarla, Anjana; Barua, Anitesh; Whinston, Andrew B.
署名单位:
University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
刊物名称:
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
ISSN/ISSBN:
0742-1222
DOI:
10.2753/MIS0742-1222260209
发表日期:
2009
页码:
205-240
关键词:
or-buy decisions
vertical integration
Contract design
performance
governance
firm
environment
REMEDIES
outcomes
matter
摘要:
Application service providers (ASP), which host and maintain information technology (IT) applications across the Internet, offer in alternative to traditional models 4 IT service for user firms. We build oil prior literature in transaction cost economics (TCE) to argue that the contract design should address ex post transaction costs that result due to contractual incompleteness and opportunism. We argue that contract design is multidimensional, and that it is necessary to design governance structures that Call protect user firms from shirking and monitoring costs, as well as provide for efficient adaptation when requirements are incompletely specified at the start. of the initiative. Our empirical analysis suggests that factors such as uncertainty in specifying service requirements, interdependence between the ASP application and IT systems in the client organization, and the need for specific investments favor time and materials contracts, whereas fixed prices are desirable when strong incentives are needed for cost reduction. We also find that contracts that are aligned with transaction attributes in a transaction cost-economizing manner are significantly less likely to experience budget overruns and realize better ex post performance than those that are not. These, results hold normative implications for both user and provider firms to assess the performance implications of choosing contracts in line with prescriptions of TCE.