Information Feedback, Targeting, and Coordination: An Experimental Study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hashim, Matthew J.; Kannan, Karthik N.; Maximiano, Sandra
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1047-7047
• DOI: 10.1287/isre.2016.0663
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 289-308
• 关键词: OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE; public-goods; voluntary provision; digital piracy; BEHAVIOR; PARTICIPATION; RECIPROCITY; IMPACT; games; ENFORCEMENT

摘要

There are many contexts in which an everybody else is doing it attitude is relevant. We evaluate the impact of this attitude in a multithreshold public goods game. We use a lab experiment to study the role of providing information about contribution behavior to targeted subsets of individuals, and its effect on coordination. Treatments include one in which no information is provided and three other treatments, i.e., where information is provided to a random sample of subjects; to those whose contributions are below the average of their group, and to those whose contributions are above the average of their group. We find that the random provision of information is no different than not providing information. More important, average contributions improve with targeted treatments. Coordination waste is also lower with targeted treatments. The insights from this research are more broadly relevant in the contexts of piracy, open innovation, and crowdfunding.