Managing the Performance Trade-Offs from Partner Integration: Implications of Contract Choice in R&D Projects

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
MacCormack, Alan; Mishra, Anant
署名单位:
Harvard University; George Mason University
刊物名称:
PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
ISSN/ISSBN:
1059-1478
DOI:
10.1111/poms.12374
发表日期:
2015
页码:
1552-1569
关键词:
common method variance SOFTWARE-DEVELOPMENT development alliances empirical-analysis information-technology RELATIONAL GOVERNANCE STRATEGIC ALLIANCES PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT control mechanisms FORMAL CONTRACTS
摘要:
Formal contracts represent an important governance instrument with which firms exercise control of and compensate partners in R&D projects. The specific type of contract used, however, can vary significantly across projects. In some, firms' govern partnering relationships through fixed-price contracts, whereas in others, firms' use more flexible time and materials or performance-based contracts. How do these choices affect the costs and benefits that arise from greater levels of partner integration? Furthermore, how are these relationships affected when the choice of contract is misaligned with the scope and objectives of the partnering relationship? Our study addresses these questions using data from 172 R&D projects that involve partners. We find that, (i) greater partner integration is associated with higher project costs for all contract types; (ii) greater partner integration is associated with higher product quality only in projects that adopt more flexible time and materials or performance-based contracts; and (iii) in projects where the choice of contract is misaligned with the scope and objectives of the partnering relationship, greater partner integration is associated with higher project costs, but not with higher product quality. Our results shed light on the subtle interplay between formal and relational contracting. They have important implications for practice, with respect to designing optimal governance structures in partnered R&D projects.