Impulse Balance and Multiple-Period Feedback in the Newsvendor Game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ockenfels, Axel; Selten, Reinhard
• 署名单位: University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1111/poms.12399
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1901-1906
• 关键词: myopic loss aversion; stationary concepts; decision-making; prospect-theory; BEHAVIOR; models

摘要

Human subjects in the newsvendor game place suboptimal orders: orders are typically between the expected profit-maximizing quantity and mean demand (pull-to-center bias). In previous work, we have shown that impulse balance equilibrium (IBE), which is based on a simple ex post rationality principle along with an equilibrium condition, can predict ordering decisions in the laboratory. In this study, we extend IBE to standing orders and multiple-period feedback and show that it predicts-in line with previous findings-that constraining newsvendors to make a standing order for a sequence of periods moves the average of submitted orders toward the optimum.