Efficiency or Competition? A Structural Econometric Analysis of Canada's AWS Auction and the Set-Aside Provision

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hyndman, Kyle; Parmeter, Christopher F.
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Miami
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1111/poms.12291
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 821-839
• 关键词: Combinatorial auctions; SPECIAL-ISSUE; procurement; INFORMATION; allocation; reduction

摘要

In 2008, Industry Canada auctioned 105MHz of spectrum to a group of bidders that included incumbents and potential new entrants into the Canadian mobile phone market, raising $4.25billion. In an effort to promote new entry, 40MHz of spectrum was set-aside for new entrants. In order to estimate the implicit cost of the set-aside provision, we estimate the parameters of the bidders' profit function via a maximum match estimator based on the notion of pairwise stability in matches. We find that all telecommunications firms valued both geographic complementarities across auction licenses as well as absolute spectrum. Under a reasonable alternative scenario, our results indicate that the set-aside led to a total profit loss of approximately 10%.