Initiating Supplier New Product Development Projects: A Behavioral Investigation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wuttke, David A.; Donohue, Karen; Siemsen, Enno
• 署名单位: European Business School (EBS) University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1111/poms.12784
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 80-99
• 关键词: Loss aversion; moral hazard; INNOVATION; CONTRACTS; fairness; INFORMATION; incentives; DECISION; RISK; RENEGOTIATION

摘要

While suppliers are often an excellent source of product innovation for buyers, their propensity to undertake or continue a product development project can be elusive. This study examines how characteristics of the innovation project, including the type of project revenue, type of cost uncertainty, and the contract frame, influence the decision to accept, and subsequently continue, an innovation project. Through a series of controlled behavioral experiments, we find that acceptance rates increase when projects are characterized by a low real options value or an entirely new (vs. replacement) revenue stream. While these factors have less influence on the supplier's decision to continue the project, once accepted, continuation rates do increase if acceptance and continuation decisions are made by the same person. We also find that using a reward (vs. penalty) frame for sustaining supplier engagements significantly increases acceptance rates.