Inducing Supply Chain Transparency through Supplier Encroachment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guan, Xu; Liu, Baoshan; Chen, Ying-ju; Wang, Hongwei
• 署名单位: Huazhong University of Science & Technology; China University of Geosciences; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Huazhong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1111/poms.13133
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 725-749
• 关键词: quality disclosure; INFORMATION; channel; COORDINATION; acquisition; MARKET

摘要

This study investigates a supplier's voluntary disclosure strategy when it can encroach on a retailer's operations by selling directly to final consumers. The establishment of a direct sales channel expands market potential, induces the supplier to adopt a more frequent disclosure strategy, and ultimately leads to a higher level of information transparency in the supply chain. Since more quality information is revealed in the presence of a dual channel, the retailer is able to free ride on the supplier's disclosure to enhance consumers' quality expectations. In most cases, such a free-riding effect is positive and can even create a higher ex ante payoff for the retailer in face of the supplier's encroachment. Conversely, more transparent product quality information does not necessarily benefit the supplier, who can then no longer hide negative quality information from consumers due to the potential change in the channel structure. Thus, we show that the supplier's ex ante payoff may become lower with encroachment and that the supplier may commit not to encroach on the retail market, even when it has a free option to open a direct sales channel.