Revenue Management with Bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bhandari, Atul; Secomandi, Nicola
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0030-364X
• DOI: 10.1287/opre.1100.0895
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 498-506
• 关键词: Mechanism design

摘要

Static game-theoretic models of bilateral bargaining assume that the seller knows his valuation for the item that is up for sale; that is, how the seller may determine this quantity is exogenous to these models. In this paper, we develop and analyze a stylized Markov decision process that endogenizes the seller's computation of his marginal inventory valuation in an infinite-horizon revenue management setting when each sale occurs according to a given bilateral bargaining mechanism. We use this model to compare, both analytically and numerically, the seller's performance under four basic bilateral bargaining mechanisms with a tractable information structure. These comparisons provide insights into the seller's performance under the following trading arrangements: buyer and seller posted pricing, negotiated pricing, and rule-based pricing.