Patrolling Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alpern, Steve; Morton, Alec; Papadaki, Katerina
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0030-364X
• DOI: 10.1287/opre.1110.0983
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1246-1257
• 关键词: infiltration game

摘要

A key operational problem for those charged with the security of vulnerable facilities (such as airports or art galleries) is the scheduling and deployment of patrols. Motivated by the problem of optimizing randomized, and thus unpredictable, patrols, we present a class of patrolling games. The facility to be patrolled can be thought of as a network or graph Q of interconnected nodes (e. g., rooms, terminals), and the Attacker can choose to attack any node of Q within a given time T. He requires m consecutive periods there, uninterrupted by the Patroller, to commit his nefarious act (and win). The Patroller can follow any path on the graph. Thus, the patrolling game is a win-lose game, where the Value is the probability that the Patroller successfully intercepts an attack, given best play on both sides. We determine analytically either the Value of the game, or bounds on the Value, for various classes of graphs, and we discuss possible extensions and generalizations.