Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Day, Robert W.; Cramton, Peter
署名单位：
University of Connecticut; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
刊物名称：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0030-364X
DOI：
10.1287/opre.1110.1024
发表日期：
2012
页码：
588-603
关键词：
摘要：
We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe. Specifically, we compute a unique point in the core that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from a reference point, for example, from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. Analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we demonstrate that the resulting payments can be decomposed into a series of economically meaningful and equitable penalties. Furthermore, we discuss the benefits of this combinatorial auction, explore the use of alternative reserve pricing approaches in this context, and indicate the results of several hundred computational runs using CATS data.
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