Technical Note-Managing a Secret Project
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Pinker, Edieal; Szmerekovsky, Joseph; Tilson, Vera
署名单位：
University of Rochester; North Dakota State University Fargo; University of Rochester
刊物名称：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0030-364X
DOI：
10.1287/opre.1120.1123
发表日期：
2013
页码：
65-72
关键词：
摘要：
We study project scheduling in a competitive setting taking the perspective of a project manager with an adversary, using a Stackelberg game format. The project manager seeks to limit the adversary's opportunity to react to the project and therefore wants to manage the project in a way that keeps the adversary in the dark as long as possible while completing the project on time. We formulate and illustrate a new form of project management problem for secret projects where the project manager uses a combination of deception, task scheduling, and crashing to minimize the time between when the adversary initiates a response to the project to when the project is completed. We propose a novel mixed-integer linear programming formulation for the problem and determine characteristics of optimal schedules in this context. Using a detailed example of nuclear weapons development, we illustrate the interconnectedness of the deception, task scheduling, and crashing, and how these influence adversary behavior.