Strategic Customers in a Transportation Station: When Is It Optimal to Wait?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Manou, Athanasia; Economou, Antonis; Karaesmen, Fikri
• 署名单位: National & Kapodistrian University of Athens; Koc University
• 刊物名称: OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0030-364X
• DOI: 10.1287/opre.2014.1280
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 910-925
• 关键词: service; QUEUE; BEHAVIOR; IMPACT

摘要

We consider a transportation station, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process. A transportation facility visits the station according to a renewal process and serves at each visit a random number of customers according to its capacity. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the station or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study the strategic behavior of the customers and determine their symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies under two levels of information.