Effects of Competition in a Secretary Problem
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Cownden, Daniel; Steinsaltz, David
署名单位：
University of St Andrews; University of Oxford
刊物名称：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0030-364X
DOI：
10.1287/opre.2013.1233
发表日期：
2014
页码：
104-113
关键词：
摘要：
In a novel multiplayer extension of the famous secretary problem, multiple players seek to employ secretaries from a common labour pool. Secretaries do not accept being put on hold, always accept job offers immediately, and leave the labour pool once rejected by a single player. All players have an identical preference for secretaries, and all players seek to optimize the probability of obtaining the best of all n secretaries. We find that in the Nash equilibrium, as the number, N, of players searching the labour pool grows, the optimal strategy converges to a simple function of N. For the two-player case we also compute how much players can gain through cooperation and how the optimal strategy changes under a payoff structure that promotes spite.