Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ashlagi, Itai; Braverman, Mark; Hassidim, Avinatan
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Princeton University; Bar Ilan University
• 刊物名称: OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0030-364X
• DOI: 10.1287/opre.2014.1276
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 713-732
• 关键词: Incentives; EFFICIENCY; substitutes; CONVERGENCE; equilibrium

摘要

Labor markets can often be viewed as many-to-one matching markets. It is well known that if complementarities are present in such markets, a stable matching may not exist. We study large random matching markets with couples. We introduce a new matching algorithm and show that if the number of couples grows slower than the size of the market, a stable matching will be found with high probability. If however, the number of couples grows at a linear rate, with constant probability (not depending on the market size), no stable matching exists. Our results explain data from the market for psychology interns.