Judge: Don't Vote!

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Balinski, Michel; Laraki, Rida
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
• 刊物名称: OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0030-364X
• DOI: 10.1287/opre.2014.1269
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 483-511
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; majority judgment; ARROWS CONDITIONS; equity

摘要

This article argues that the traditional model of the theory of social choice is not a good model and does not lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing. It presents a more meaningful and realistic model that leads naturally to a method of ranking and electing-majority judgment-that better meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method. It gives descriptions of its successful use in several different practical situations and compares it with other methods including Condorcet's, Borda's, first-past-the-post, and approval voting.