Technical Note-Nonlinear Pricing Competition with Private Capacity Information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nazerzadeh, Hamid; Perakis, Georgia
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0030-364X
• DOI: 10.1287/opre.2015.1463
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 329-340
• 关键词: supply function equilibria; common-agency games; demand forecasts; chain; constraints; revelation; CONTRACTS; principal; strategy; leakage

摘要

We analyze the equilibrium of an incomplete information game consisting of two capacity-constrained suppliers and a single retailer. The capacity of each supplier is her private information. Conditioned on their capacities, the suppliers simultaneously and noncooperatively offer quantity-price schedules to the retailer. Then, the retailer decides on the quantities to purchase from each supplier to maximize his own utility. We prove the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium for this game. We show that at the equilibrium each (infinitesimal) unit of the supply is assigned a marginal price that is independent of the capacities and depends only on the valuation function of the retailer and the distribution of the capacities. In addition, the supplier with the larger capacity sells all her supply.