Information Elicitation and Influenza Vaccine Production

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chick, Stephen E.; Hasija, Sameer; Nasiry, Javad
• 署名单位: INSEAD Business School; INSEAD Business School; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0030-364X
• DOI: 10.1287/opre.2016.1552
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 75-96
• 关键词: Supply chain coordination; cost-effectiveness; random yields; CONTRACTS; benefits; delivery; ORDER

摘要

We explore the procurement of influenza vaccines by a government whose objective is to minimize the expected social costs (including vaccine, vaccine administration, and influenza treatment costs) when a for-profit vaccine supplier has production yield uncertainty, private information about its productivity (adverse selection), and potentially unverifiable production effort (moral hazard). Timeliness is important-costs for both the supplier and the government procurer may increase if part of the vaccine order is delivered after a scheduled delivery date. We theoretically derive the optimal menu of output-based contracts. Next, we present a menu that is optimal within a more restricted set of practically implementable contracts, and numerically show that such a menu leads to near-optimal outcomes. Finally, we present a novel way to eliminate that information rent if the manufacturer's effort is also verifiable, a counterintuitive result because the manufacturer has private productivity information. This provides an upper bound for the government on how much it should spend to monitor the manufacturer's effort.