Technical Note-Optimal Long-Term Supply Contracts with Asymmetric Demand Information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lobel, Ilan; Xiao, Wenqiang
• 署名单位: New York University
• 刊物名称: OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0030-364X
• DOI: 10.1287/opre.2017.1626
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1275-1284
• 关键词: Dynamic mechanism; DESIGN; COORDINATION; auction; chain

摘要

We consider a manufacturer selling to a retailer with private demand information arising dynamically over an infinite time horizon. Under a backlogging model, we show that the manufacturer's optimal dynamic long-term contract takes a simple form: in the first period, based on her private demand forecast, the retailer selects a wholesale price and pays an associated upfront fee, and, from then on, the two parties stick to a simple wholesale price contract with the retailer's chosen price. Under a lost sales model, we show that the structure of the optimal long-term contract combines a menu of wholesale pricing contracts with an option that, if exercised by the retailer, reduces future wholesale prices in exchange for an immediate payment to the manufacturer.