Winner-Take-All Games: The Strategic Optimisation of Rank
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Alpern, Steve; Howard, J. V.
署名单位：
University of Warwick; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
刊物名称：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0030-364X
DOI：
10.1287/opre.2017.1635
发表日期：
2017
页码：
1165-1176
关键词：
摘要：
In many competitive situations (including nearly all sports) a player's aim is not simply to maximise his score but to maximise its rank among all scores. Examples include sales contests (where the salesman with the highest monthly sales gets a bonus) and patent races (where lowest time is best). We assume the score X-i of player i is obtained costlessly, so that his utility is the probability of having the best score. This gives a constant-sum game. All that matters for player i is the distribution of his score, so we assume he chooses from a given convex set of distributions F-i. We call such games distribution ranking games, and characterise their solution for various classes of the distribution sets F-i, such as distributions with given mean or moment, where we extend a result of Bell and Cover.
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