Matching While Learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Johari, Ramesh; Kamble, Vijay; Kanoria, Yash
• 署名单位: Stanford University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0030-364X
• DOI: 10.1287/opre.2020.2013
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 655-681
• 关键词: stability; mixtures

摘要

We consider the problem faced by a service platform that needs to match limited supply with demand while learning the attributes of new users to match them better in the future. We introduce a benchmark model with heterogeneous workers (demand) and a limited supply of jobs that arrive over time. Job types are known to the platform, but worker types are unknown and must be learned by observing match outcomes. Workers depart after performing a certain number of jobs. The expected payoff from a match depends on the pair of types, and the goal is to maximize the steady-state rate of accumulation of payoff. Although we use terminology inspired by labor markets, our framework applies more broadly to platforms where a limited supply of heterogeneous products is matched to users over time. Our main contribution is a complete characterization of the structure of the optimal policy in the limit that each worker performs many jobs. The platform faces a tradeoff for each worker between myopically maximizing payoffs (exploitation) and learning the type of the worker (exploration). This creates a multitude of multiarmed bandit problems, one for each worker, coupled together by the constraint on availability of jobs of different types (capacity constraints). We find that the platform should estimate a shadow price for each job type and use the payoffs adjusted by these prices first to determine its learning goals and then for each worker (i) to balance learning with payoffs during the exploration phase and (ii) to myopically match after it has achieved its learning goals during the exploitation phase.