Cav u and the dual game
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
De Meyer, B; Rosenberg, D
署名单位：
Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Paris 13
刊物名称：
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0364-765X
DOI：
10.1287/moor.24.3.619
发表日期：
1999
页码：
619-626
关键词：
摘要：
We give an alternative proof of a theorem of Aumann and Maschler that characterizes the limit of the values of finitely repeated games with lack of information on one side as the concavification of the value of the game where none of the players has any information. Our proof is based on Fenchel duality techniques.
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