Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium: Definition and Computational Complexity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: von Stengel, Bernhard; Forges, Francoise
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0364-765X
• DOI: 10.1287/moor.1080.0340
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1002-1022
• 关键词: efficient computation; games; COMMUNICATION; BEHAVIOR

摘要

This paper defines the extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) for extensive games with perfect recall. The EFCE concept extends Aumann's strategic-form correlated equilibrium (CE). Before the game starts, a correlation device generates a move for each information set. This move is recommended to the player only when the player reaches the information set. In two-player perfect-recall extensive games without chance moves, the set of EFCE can be described by a polynomial number of consistency and incentive constraints. Assuming P is not equal to NP, this is not possible for the set of CE, or if the game has chance moves.