What matchings can be stable? The testable implications of matching theory

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Echenique, Federico
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0364-765X
• DOI: 10.1287/moor.1080.0318
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 757-768
• 关键词: stability; restrictions; equilibrium; INFORMATION; marriage; games; set

摘要

This paper studies the falsi. ability of two-sided matching theory when agents' preferences are unknown. A collection of matchings is rationalizable if there are preferences for the agents involved so that the matchings are stable. We show that there are nonrationalizable collections of matchings; hence, the theory is falsi. able. We also characterize the rationalizable collections of matchings, which leads to a test of matching theory in the spirit of revealed-preference tests of individual optimizing behavior.