Random Order Congestion Games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Penn, Michal; Polukarov, Maria; Tennenholtz, Moshe
署名单位：
Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Southampton; Microsoft; MICROSOFT ISRAEL
刊物名称：
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0364-765X
DOI：
10.1287/moor.1090.0394
发表日期：
2009
页码：
706-725
关键词：
摘要：
We introduce a new class of games called random order congestion games (ROCGs). In an ROCG, each player has a task that can be carried out by any element of a set of resources, and each resource executes its assigned tasks in a random order. The aim of each player is to minimize his expected cost, which is the sum of the fixed costs over the set of his utilized resources and the expected cost of his task execution. The cost of a player's task execution is determined by the earliest time his task is completed, and thus it might be beneficial for him to assign his task to several resources. We prove the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in ROCGs. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for finding such an equilibrium in a given ROCG.
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