Perfect-Information Games with Lower-Semicontinuous Payoffs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Flesch, Janos; Kuipers, Jeroen; Mashiah-Yaakovi, Ayala; Schoenmakers, Gijs; Solan, Eilon; Vrieze, Koos
• 署名单位: Maastricht University; Maastricht University; Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0364-765X
• DOI: 10.1287/moor.1100.0469
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 742-755
• 关键词: 2-player stochastic games; subgame-perfection

摘要

We prove that every multiplayer perfect-information game with bounded and lower-semicontinuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille [Solan, E., N. Vieille. 2003. Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games. J. Math. Econom. 39 911-929], which shows that a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies need not exist when the payoffs are not lower-semicontinuous. In addition, if the range of payoffs is finite, we characterize in the form of a Folk Theorem the set of all plays and payoffs that are induced by subgame-perfect 0-equilibria in pure strategies.