Perfect Information Games with Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Purves, Roger A.; Sudderth, William D.
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
刊物名称：
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0364-765X
DOI：
10.1287/moor.1110.0504
发表日期：
2011
页码：
468-473
关键词：
摘要：
It has been shown that every n-person, perfect information game with no chance moves and bounded, lower semicontinuous payoffs has a subgame perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies. Here the same is proved when the payoffs are bounded and upper semicontinuous.