Simultaneous Ad Auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ashlagi, Itai; Monderer, Dov; Tennenholtz, Moshe
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Microsoft; MICROSOFT ISRAEL
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0364-765X
• DOI: 10.1287/moor.1100.0475
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1-13
• 关键词: competition

摘要

We consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A are pointwise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In contrast, we show that this revenue ranking does not hold when advertisers can participate in both auctions.