Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tomala, Tristan
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0364-765X
• DOI: 10.1287/moor.2013.0594
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 617-637
• 关键词: Discounted repeated games; 2-person repeated games; partial folk theorem; incomplete information; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; players; payoffs

摘要

This paper considers a general model of repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. We study belief-free communication equilibria (BFCE) defined as follows. Players communicate with. a mediator who receives types and signals and recommends actions. A BFCE is a communication device such that all players have an incentive to play faithfully, irrespectively of their belief about the state. We characterize BFCE payoffs for any repeated game with incomplete information in terms of one-shot payoff functions, information, and signaling structure.