Zero-Sum Polymatrix Games: A Generalization of Minmax
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Cai, Yang; Candogan, Ozan; Daskalakis, Constantinos; Papadimitriou, Christos
署名单位：
McGill University; University of Chicago; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
刊物名称：
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0364-765X
DOI：
10.1287/moor.2015.0745
发表日期：
2016
页码：
648-655
关键词：
摘要：
We show that in zero-sum polymatrix games, a multiplayer generalization of two-person zero-sum games, Nash equilibria can be found efficiently with linear programming. We also show that the set of coarse correlated equilibria collapses to the set of Nash equilibria. In contrast, other important properties of two-person zero-sum games are not preserved: Nash equilibrium payoffs need not be unique, and Nash equilibrium strategies need not be exchangeable or max-min.
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