Subgame-Perfect ε-Equilibria in Perfect Information Games with Common Preferences at the Limit

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Flesch, Janos; Predtetchinski, Arkadi
• 署名单位: Maastricht University; Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0364-765X
• DOI: 10.1287/moor.2015.0774
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1208-1221
• 关键词: Stochastic games

摘要

We prove the existence of a pure subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium, for every epsilon > 0, in multiplayer perfect information games, provided that the payoff functions are bounded and exhibit common preferences at the limit. If, in addition, the payoff functions have finite range, then there exists a pure subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium. These results extend and unify recent existence theorems for bounded and semicontinuous payoffs.