Where Strategic and Evolutionary Stability Depart-A Study of Minimal Diversity Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Balkenborg, Dieter; Vermeulen, Dries
• 署名单位: University of Exeter; Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0364-765X
• DOI: 10.1287/moor.2015.0727
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 278-292
• 关键词: stable equilibria; definition; REFORMULATION; selection

摘要

A minimal diversity game is an n player strategic form game in which each player has m pure strategies at his disposal. The payoff to each player is always 1, unless all players select the same pure strategy, in which case, all players receive zero payoff. Such a game has a unique isolated completely mixed Nash equilibrium in which each player plays each strategy with equal probability, and a connected component of Nash equilibria consisting of those strategy profiles in which each player receives payoff 1. The Pareto superior component is shown to be asymptotically stable under a wide class of evolutionary dynamics, while the isolated equilibrium is not. In contrast, the isolated equilibrium is strategically stable, while the strategic stability of the Pareto-efficient component depends on the dimension of the component, and hence on the number of players, and the number of pure strategies.