On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol; McLean, Richard P.
• 署名单位: Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0364-765X
• DOI: 10.1287/moor.2017.0849
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 100-129
• 关键词: pure-strategy equilibria; Bertrand-Edgeworth competition; discontinuous economic games; all-pay auction; incomplete information; Demand uncertainty; 1st-price auctions; Cournot duopoly; oligopoly; price

摘要

We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. By allowing for payoff discontinuities in actions, we cover various applications that cannot be handled by extant results.