Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Renault, Jerome; Ziliotto, Bruno
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0364-765X
• DOI: 10.1287/moor.2019.1015
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 889-895
• 关键词: player repeated games; folk theorem

摘要

We study the limit of equilibrium payoffs, as the discount factor goes to one, in non-zero-sum stochastic games. We first show that the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs always converges. We then provide two-player examples in which the whole set of equilibrium payoffs diverges. The construction is robust to perturbations of the payoffs and to the introduction of normal-form correlation.