Terminal Ranking Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bayraktar, Erhan; Zhang, Yuchong
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0364-765X
• DOI: 10.1287/moor.2020.1107
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1349-1365
• 关键词: mean-field games

摘要

We analyze a mean field tournament: a mean field game in which the agents receive rewards according to the ranking of the terminal value of their projects and are subject to cost of effort. Using Schrodinger bridges we are able to explicitly calculate the equilibrium. This allows us to identify the reward functions which would yield a desired equilibrium and solve several related mechanism design problems. We are also able to identify the effect of reward inequality on the players' welfare as well as calculate the price of anarchy.