The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barman, Siddharth; Echenique, Federico
• 署名单位: Indian Institute of Science (IISC) - Bangalore; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0364-765X
• DOI: 10.1287/moor.2022.1263
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 313-331
• 关键词: Core; MARKETS; complexity

摘要

We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably retraded) by coalitions of small size, and show that these allocations must be approximate Walrasian equilibria. Our results imply that deciding whether an allocation is approximately Walrasian can be done in polynomial time, even in economies for which finding an equilibrium is known to be computationally hard.